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Abstract
As the interest in using policy-based approaches for 
systems management grows, it is becoming increasingly 
important to develop methods for performing analysis 
and refinement of policy specifications.  Although this is 
an area that researchers have devoted some attention to, 
none of the proposed solutions address the issues of 
analysing specifications that combine authorisation and 
management policies; analysing policy specifications that 
contain constraints on the applicability of the policies; 
and performing a priori analysis of the specification that 
will both detect the presence of inconsistencies and 
explain the situations in which the conflict will occur.   
This paper presents a method for transforming both 
policy and system behaviour specifications into a formal 
notation that is based on Event Calculus.  Additionally it 
describes how this formalism can be used in conjunction 
with abductive reasoning techniques to perform a priori 
analysis of policy specifications for the various conflict 
types identified in the literature.  Finally, it presents some 
initial thoughts on how this notation and analysis 
technique could be used to perform policy refinement. 
1. Introduction 
Policy based approaches to systems management are 
of particular importance because they allow the 
separation of the rules that govern the behaviour of a 
system from the functionality provided by that system [1].  
This means that it is possible to adapt the behaviour of a 
system without the need to recode functionality, and 
changes can be applied without stopping the system.  
Research into policy based systems management has 
focussed on languages for specifying policies and 
architectures for managing and deploying policies in 
distributed environments.  However, policy analysis and 
refinement remains a much-neglected research problem. 
Whilst some previous work has investigated the nature of 
modality and application specific conflicts in policy 
specifications [2, 3], there still remain significant areas 
for improvement.  In particular it is important to be able 
to analyse policies in the presence of constraints that 
control their applicability.  When doing this, in addition 
to detecting the presence of conflicts, it is necessary to 
identify the exact causes for those conflicts to arise. 
Addressing these needs requires a formalism that will 
model both system behaviour and policy such that formal 
reasoning techniques can be used to analyse policy 
specifications.
The initial focus of our work has been to develop a 
formal representation for policies and the managed 
systems that will support formal reasoning techniques for 
detecting conflicts between policies. Existing policy 
specification formalisms [3-5] only handle security or 
management policies even though most real world 
systems use a combination of the two. Also, these 
approaches use deductive reasoning techniques for policy 
analysis, which require complete specification of the 
system state in order to produce useful results.  Finally, it 
is important to be able to analyse a policy specification 
before it is deployed. However, none of the existing 
studies seem to model the system behaviour to support a 
priori analysis of policy specifications that are 
constrained on the runtime state of the system.   
In this paper, we propose a formalism that is based on 
the standard Event Calculus [6] to model both 
authorisation and management policy specifications 
together with system behaviour. Event Calculus was 
chosen as an appropriate basis for formalising policy 
specifications as both the policies and the management 
behaviour we are modelling are event driven.  
Additionally, since an Event Calculus specification of a 
system can be generated from a state transition model, 
users can specify the management behaviour using a 
familiar high-level notation. In a similar fashion, it is 
possible to translate policies specified in a high-level 
policy specification language, like Ponder [7], into an 
Event Calculus representation that describes the 
semantics of the policy language. This eliminates the need 
for the user to become conversant with the details of logic 
programming and the Event Calculus notation.  Having 
developed the Event Calculus representation, we show 
how our formalism supports the specification of rules for 
detecting both modality conflicts and application specific 
conflicts, such as conflicts of duty. Using abductive 
reasoning techniques, we are able to analyse the policy 
specifications to identify existing conflicts and provide 
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2explanations on how they might arise. Because the 
abduction process is applied to a specification that models 
both the systems behaviour and the policy specification it 
is possible to detect conflicts when the applicability of the 
policies is constrained on the runtime state of the system. 
Furthermore, by using abduction, the analysis can be 
performed even with partial specifications of the system 
state. We also expect that this formalism will allow the 
use of other reasoning techniques likely to be useful in 
developing an approach for policy refinement. 
Although the initial focus of our work has been on 
policy analysis, the end objective of this research is to 
develop tools and analysis techniques that will support 
policy refinement. Policy hierarchies and the application 
of policy refinement to derive lower-level, more specific 
policies from high-level ones are introduced in [8] and are 
motivated by the following needs: 
x To determine the resources that are needed to satisfy 
the requirements of the policy. 
x To translate high-level policies into operational 
policies that can be enforced by the system. 
x To verify that the set of lower level policies actually 
meets the requirements of the high-level policy. 
In requirements engineering, Darimont et al. present 
an approach that uses goal regression and refinement 
patterns that allow high-level requirements to be stated in 
terms of a combination of lower level ones [9]. In this 
paper, we follow a similar approach of developing policy 
refinement patterns, and outline a technique that uses 
abductive reasoning to ensure consistency and 
completeness when instantiating policies based on these 
patterns. 
The next section presents a brief outline of the main  
policy types being considered, together with a description 
of the Event Calculus and the reasoning techniques used 
in this work. Section 3 presents the specification 
language.  Section 4 explains how the formalism can be 
used to detect various types of conflicts.  Section 5 
outlines the initial approach for policy refinement.  
Sections 6 and 7 discuss the formalism presented and 
related work in this area of research.  Finally, section 8 
presents our conclusions together with plans for future 
work.
2. Background 
2.1 Policy Specification 
Existing research on policy based systems has 
identified several types of policy that are useful in 
managing distributed systems [7].  Broadly, policies can 
by classified into authorisation policies and management 
policies where the former category captures the access 
control requirements of a system and the latter category 
holds requirements related to the system behaviour.  The 
Ponder language [7], developed at Imperial College, is a 
declarative language that supports both of these policy 
types. 
Authorisation policies specify whether a subject is 
permitted perform a particular action on a target.  In a 
closed system, with a default policy of prohibiting all 
subjects from performing operations on all targets, 
positive authorisation policies would be used to explicitly 
specify which particular operations a subject is permitted 
to perform on a target.  Alternatively, in an open system, 
where by default all operations are permitted, negative 
authorisations would be used to specify that a subject is 
not permitted to perform an operation on a target.  
Examples of positive and negative authorisations as 
specified in the Ponder language are shown in Figure 1. 
A policy-based access control system is the 
combination of the policies that specify the permitted/ 
prohibited operations, an access control model that 
defines how the permissions are organised across the 
system, and a reference monitor that uses the access 
control model to enforce the policies.   
Obligation policies specify management operations 
that must be performed when a particular event occurs 
given some supplementary conditions being true.  They 
are specified in terms of a subject that should perform a 
particular action on a target when a specified condition is 
true.  Obligation policies are event based and therefore 
the occurrence of the specified event is a necessary 
condition for the mandated operation to be performed.  
Another difference is that obligation policies cause the 
agent enforcing the policy to actually perform the 
specified action rather than just specify that the operation 
is permitted. An example of an obligation policy is shown 
in Figure 2. 
// only a root process can cancel a print job
auth+ cancelJobRoot {
subject    process/; 
target     printManager; 
action     cancelDoc(Job); 
when       process.owner == root;
}
// non root processes cannot cancel print jobs if
// the job being cancelled is not owned by the 
// requesting process
auth- cancelJobOther {
subject process/;
target printManager;
 action    cancelDoc(Job);
when process.owner != root &&
                   Job.owner != process.owner; 
}
Figure 1: Examples of authorisation policies. 
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3Refrain policies allow the administrator to specify 
conditions under which certain operations should not be 
performed. They are similar to negative authorisation 
policies as they are both used to prevent an action from 
being performed on a target. However, unlike 
authorisations, which are interpreted by the target object’s 
access controller, refrain policies are interpreted by the 
subject and can be used in situations where the target 
does not wish to be protected from the subject such as 
information disclosure policies. 
Prior work on policy specification has illustrated the 
power of using a domain model as a tool for organising 
objects in a system. Domains provide a means of 
grouping objects to which policies apply and can be used 
to partition the objects in large systems according to 
geographical boundaries, object type, responsibility and 
authority. Membership of a domain is explicit and not 
defined in terms of a predicate on object attributes.  An 
advantage of specifying policy scope in terms of domains 
is that objects can be added and removed from the 
domains to which policies apply without having to 
change the policies [10].  
The Ponder language provides support for specifying 
authorisation, obligation and refrain policies. Its object 
oriented features and grouping constructs facilitate ease 
of use and scalability to large systems and large numbers 
of policies. However, Ponder is not a logic based 
language and does not provide direct support for formal 
reasoning methods or for expressing general models of 
system behaviour. Therefore, Ponder cannot account for 
the effect of policies on system state and cannot be used 
directly for policy analysis.  However, as will be shown 
here, it is possible to transform Ponder policies into a 
formal representation that supports both a description of 
the system behaviour and formal reasoning techniques for 
policy analysis. 
2.2 Event Calculus and Abductive Reasoning 
Event Calculus (EC) is a formal language for 
representing and reasoning about dynamic systems.  
Because the language supports a representation of time 
that is independent of any events that might occur in the 
system, it is a particularly useful way to specify a variety 
of event-driven systems.  Since its initial presentation [6], 
a number of variations of the Event Calculus have been 
presented in the literature [11].  In this work we use the 
form presented in [12], consisting of (i) a set of time 
points (that can be mapped to the non-negative integers); 
(ii) a set of properties that can vary over the lifetime of 
the system, called fluents; and (iii) a set of event types.  In 
addition the language includes a number of base 
predicates, initiates, terminates, holdsAt, happens,
which are used to define some auxiliary predicates; and 
domain independent axioms.  These are summarised 
below: 
Base predicates:
initiates(A,B,T)  event A initiates fluent B for all time > T. 
terminates(A,B,T)  event A terminates fluent B for all time > T. 
happens(A,T)  event A happens at time point T 
holdsAt(B,T)  fluent B holds at time point T.  This predicate
  is useful for defining static rules (state  
  constraints). 
initiallyTrue(B) fluent B is initially true. 
initiallyFalse(B) fluent B is initially false. 
Auxillary predicates:
clipped(T1,B,T2)  fluent B is terminated sometime between  
  timepoint T1 and T2. 
declipped(T1,B,T2)  fluent B is initiated sometime between  
  timepoint T1 and T2. 
Domain independent axioms:
holdsAt(B, T1) Å  holdsAt(B, T)  ¬ clipped(T, B, T1) 
 T<T1. 
holdsAt(B, T1) Å  initiates(A, B, T)  happens(A, T)
 ¬ clipped(T, B, T1)  T<T1. 
¬holdsAt(B, T1) Å  ¬holdsAt(B, T)   ¬ declipped(T, B, T1) 
  T<T1. 
¬holdsAt(B, T1) Å terminates(A, B, T)  happens(A, T)
 ¬ declipped(T, B, T1)  T<T1. 
This is the classical form of the Event Calculus where 
theories are written using Horn clauses. The frame 
problem is solved by circumscription, which allows the 
completion of the predicates initiates, terminates and 
happens, leaving open the predicates holdsAt,
initiallyTrue and initiallyFalse. This approach 
allows the representation of partial domain knowledge 
(e.g. the initial state of the system). Formulae derived by 
the Event Calculus are in effect classically derived from 
the circumscription of the EC representation. To provide 
an implementation of such a Calculus in Prolog, we use 
pos and neg functors. The semantics of the Prolog 
implementation assumes the Close Word Assumption 
(CWA) and models are essentially Herbrand models 
where predicates are appropriately completed. The use of 
pos and neg functions on the fluents allows us to keep 
// Upon system shutdown, any jobs owned by running 
// processes should be cancelled
oblig   shutdownCancellation { 
on        systemShutdown; 
subject   process/; 
target    printManager; 
action    cancelDoc(Job); 
when      Job.owner == process.owner; 
}
Figure 2: Example of an obligation policy. 
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4open the interpretation of fluents being true/false, in the 
same way as circumscription does in the classical 
representation. In this way we can guarantee that the 
implementation of our EC is sound and complete with 
respect to the classical EC formalisation. The 
correspondence between the classical EC with 
circumscription and the logic program implementation 
can be found in [11].   
The Event Calculus supports deductive, inductive and 
abductive reasoning.  Deduction uses the description of 
the system behaviour together with the history of events 
occurring in the system to derive the fluents that will hold 
at a particular point in time.  Induction aims to derive the 
descriptions of the system behaviour from a given event 
history and information about the fluents that hold at 
different points of time.  However, the reasoning 
technique that is of particular interest to our work is 
abduction. Given the descriptions of the behaviour of the 
system, abduction can be used to determine the sequence 
of events that need to occur such that a given set of 
fluents will hold at a specified point in time. 
The work described in [12] outlines how abduction 
can be used in conjunction with Event Calculus to analyse 
requirements specifications and presents a specialised set 
of Event Calculus axioms that reduce the computational 
complexity of the abductive proof procedure. 
3. A Formal Language for Policies and 
Managed Systems 
Because the enforcement of an obligation policy will 
change the state of the system, in addition to modelling 
the policy specification, it is necessary to model the 
system itself when developing a formal technique for 
analysing policies. To achieve a complete specification 
that supports formal reasoning, the following domain-
specific information must be represented in the model. 
x Objects and their organisation into domains. 
x Available management operations and the effect they 
have on the managed objects. 
x Policy rules.
Additionally, it is also necessary to define domain 
independent rules for modelling policy enforcement. In 
order to support the transformation of this information 
from high-level representations into a logical notation, we 
use the following constants, variables, functions and 
predicates:
1. Constant Symbols: Every member of Obj, where Obj
represents the set of objects in the system. 
2. Variable Symbols: These are defined using the set, 
VO, representing the attributes of objects and VP,
representing the set of parameters for the operations 
supported by the objects. 
Table 1: Function symbols. 
Symbol Description 
state(Obj, VO, Value) Represents the value of a variable of an object in the system.  It can be 
used in an initiallyTrue predicate to specify the initial state of the 
system and also as part of rules that define the effect of actions. 
operation(Obj, Action(VP)) Used to denote the operations specified in a policy function or event 
(see below) 
systemEvent(Event) Represents any event that is generated by the system at runtime and is 
used to trigger enforcement of obligation or refrain policies.  The Event 
argument specified in this term can be any application specific 
predicate or function symbol. 
doAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(VP))) Represents the event of the action specified in the operation term 
being performed by the subject, ObjSubj, on the target object, ObjTarg.
requestAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(VP))) Represents the event that occurs whenever a subject attempts to 
perform an operation on a target object.  Therefore, this is the event 
that will trigger a permission (or denial) decision to be taken by the 
target object’s access controller. 
rejectAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg,Action(VP))) Event that occurs after the enforcement decision to reject the request 
by a particular subject to perform an action is taken. 
permit(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action (VP))) Represents the permission granted to a subject, ObjSubj, to perform the 
action defined in the operation on the target, ObjTarg.
deny(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action (VP))) Used to denote that the subject, ObjSubj, is denied permission to 
perform that action on the target, ObjTarg.
oblig(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action (VP))) Denotes that the subject, ObjSubj, should perform the action specified 
in the operation term on the target, ObjTarg.
refrain(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action (VP))) Denotes that the subject, ObjSubj, should not perform the action 
specified in the operation term on the target, ObjTarg.
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53. Function Symbols: The language supports a number 
of functions that can be used as parameters in the 
basic predicate symbols of Event Calculus (Table 1) 
4. Predicate Symbols: In addition to the previously 
described Event Calculus predicates, initiates,
terminates, happens, holdsAt and initiallyTrue,
the language includes the predicate symbols defined 
in Table 2. 
Having specified the language, it is now possible to 
explain how the various symbols defined above can be 
incorporated into rules that represent the different types 
of information required for modelling a managed system.  
The sequel presents the form of these rules and illustrates 
their use through a simple example. 
3.1 Objects and Organisational Model 
Consider an organisation that has a number of 
different printers distributed through its offices.  The 
printers are organised according to properties like the 
type (colour/ b&w), capacity (high volume/ low volume) 
and physical location (4th floor/ 5th floor/ lab).  The 
printers themselves are uniquely named (skyblue, violet, 
cobalt, grey, crimson, damson). A pictorial representation 
of the printer organisation is presented in Figure 3.  
Considering each of the properties to be represented by a 
different domain, the formalism presented here can be 
used to represent the printer crimson as an object in this 
domain structure. 
object(printer-crimson).     
attr(printer-crimson, status). 
method(printer-crimson, printDoc).
method(printer-crimson, switchPaper). 
isDomain(office).   
isDomain(bw-printers).
isDomain(highvol-printers).   
isDomain(lab).
isMember(lab, office).  
isMember(highvol-printers, lab). 
office
4th floor
5th floor
lab
skyblue
low volume
black
 &
white
high volume
colour
grey
violet
cobalt
crimson
damson
Figure 3: Domain structure for organisation of printers
Table 2: Predicate symbols. 
Symbol Description 
object(Obj) Used to specify that Obj is an object in the system. 
attr(Obj, VO) Specifies that Vo is an attribute of the object, Obj.
method(Obj, Action(VP)) Represents an action supported by an object in the system.  It will be 
used to define a separate ground term for every operation specified in 
the system. 
isDomain(Obj) Defines that Obj represents a domain.  In order to indicate that a 
domain is a specialisation of an object, we also define the following 
rule: 
object(Obj) Å isDomain(Obj).
isMember(Obj, Dom) Holds if the object, Obj, is a member of the Domain, Dom.
isSubDomain(Dom1, Dom2) Å
   isDomain(Dom1), isDomain(Dom2), 
   isMember(Dom1, Dom2), Dom1 != Dom2, 
   ¬ isSubDomain(Dom2, Dom1). 
Holds if the domain represented by Dom1 is a sub-domain of Dom2.
The body of the rule is used to ensure that there are no cyclic 
relationships in the domain structure. 
isDerivedMember(Obj, Dom) Å
   object(Obj), ¬ isDomain(Obj), 
   isMember(Obj, Dom). 
isDerivedMember(Obj, Dom) Å
   object(Obj), ¬ isDomain(Obj), 
   subDomain(Dom, SubDom), 
   isDerivedMember(Obj, SubDom). 
Used to determine membership of a domain across the entire domain 
structure.  This first rule identifies all those objects that are direct 
members of the domain, Dom.  The second rule recursively identifies 
those objects that are members of sub-domains of the domain, Dom.
isValidSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(VP)) Å
                object(ObjSubj),
                object(ObjTarg),
                method(ObjTarg, Action(VP)).
Many of the function definitions above contain the tuple (ObjSubj,
operation(ObjTarg, Action(VP)).  The isValidSpec predicate is 
defined to hold if the members of this tuple are consistent with the 
specification of the managed system.  As such it is used in the body of 
any rule where functions with the tuple (ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg,
Action(VP)) are specified in the head. 
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isMember(printer-crimson, lab). 
isMember(printer-crimson, highvol-printers). 
isMember(printer-crimson, bw-printers). 
If the entire example is encoded in this manner, it is a 
simple matter to identify the set of printers that belong to 
any particular domain.  For example, assuming that 
duplicate answers are removed, the following query will 
return all the printers in the office: 
?- isDerivedMember(Printer, office). 
   Printer = printer-skyblue; Printer = printer-violet ; 
   Printer = printer-cobalt;  Printer = printer-grey ; 
   Printer = printer-crimson; Printer = printer-damson; 
3.2 System Behaviour Model 
Having modelled the domain structure for organising 
the objects in the managed system, we now extend the 
language above, using Event Calculus, to model the 
operations supported by the system and their behaviour.  
The method symbol defined in Table 2 is used to represent 
the operations that are supported by the objects in the 
system.  In order to model the behaviour of these 
operations, it is necessary to specify the pre- and post-
conditions for each operation.  Performing an operation 
on the system will modify the state of the system in such 
a way that, once the operation is complete, there will be 
some new fluents that hold, and some other fluents that 
cease to hold.  This is represented using the initiates
and terminates predicates, which are defined in the Event 
Calculus, according to the following schema: 
initiates(doAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg,
  Action(Parms))), PostTrue, Tm) Å
  validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(Parms)))
 PreCondition. 
terminates(doAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg,
  Action(Parms))), PostFalse, Tm) Å
  validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(Parms)))
 PreCondition. 
The first rule above states that when the doAction
event occurs at time, Tm, if the PreConditions are true, 
then the fluent defined by PostTrue will hold after that 
time.  Under the same conditions, the second rule states 
that the fluent defined by PostFalse will cease to hold 
after time, Tm.  In both of these rules, the PreCondition
will be represented by a conjunction of holdsAt terms, 
which are defined as part of the Event Calculus.  The 
PostTrue and PostFalse fluents are defined using state
terms that are defined in the formal language above.  The 
validSpec predicate is used to ensure that the objects and 
operations specified in the rule are consistent with the 
specification of the objects and their organisation e.g., the 
action specified is an operation defined in the interface of 
the managed object.   
Building on the example used previously, it is possible 
to illustrate the use of these rules for modelling system 
behaviour.  Consider that a print manager controls every 
printer in the system. The print manager provides 
functions for viewing the printer queue, adding and 
deleting a print job.  Additionally it is possible for the 
printers to provide diagnostic information (such as a 
paper jam) to the print manager.  The print manager can 
use the diagnostic information to correct errors, or report 
the printer status to a central management console that is 
monitored by an administrator.  An UML state chart 
representation of this functionality is shown in Figure 4. 
It is possible to transform this state chart into the Event 
Calculus notation presented previously where the input 
shown on each transition arrow is the action being 
performed; for transition between different states, the 
current state values become the PostFalse fluents; any 
actions associated with the transition and next state values 
become the PostTrue fluents; and the current state values 
become the PreConditions.  Self-transitions should not 
specify the current state as PostFalse fluents. So 
following this scheme, transition (4) in Figure 4 would be 
represented in the Event Calculus as follows: 
initiates(doAction(printer, operation(printer,
  switchPaper)), state(printer, status, busy), T) Å
  holdsAt(pos(state(printer, status, busy)), T) 
  holdsAt(pos(state(printMgr, status, jobSpooled)), T). 
initiates(doAction(printer, operation(printer,
  switchPaper)),state(printMgr,status,jobSpooled), T) Å
  holdsAt(pos(state(printer, status, busy)), T) 
  holdsAt(pos(state(printMgr, status, jobSpooled)), T). 
3.3 Policy Enforcement Model 
Analysis of policies requires the ability to determine 
the effect of a specified policy on the behaviour of the 
system.  Therefore, in addition to modelling the policy 
specification, it is necessary to define rules that model the 
enforcement of the policies.  Such rules have the effect of 
linking the policy specification to the system behaviour 
specification.
The complete policy enforcement model is illustrated 
in Figure 5.  As shown, a system event is received by the 
subject’s policy agent, which refers to the policy 
printer.status = idle
printMgr.status = jobReady
printer.status = busy
printMgr.status = jobSpooled
(3) doAction(printMgr, printer, printDoc)
printer.status=idle
printMgr.status = waiting
(1) doAction(Process, printMgr, cancelDoc(Job))
(2) doAction(Process, printerMgr(queueDoc(Job)) /
sysEvent(printReq)
 (4) doAction(printer,printer, switchPaperTray)
Figure 4: State chart for Printer system functionality. 
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7repository to determine if any of the obligation policies 
for this subject specify this event as a trigger.  If there is 
an obligation, this will cause a request to perform the 
specified action to be sent to the target.  If a refrain policy 
that prohibits this exists at the subject, then the action will 
be rejected.  Once the subject makes a request to perform 
an action on the target, the target object’s access 
controller processes it.  To do this, the access controller 
evaluates the request by referring to the policy repository 
and the access control model of the system.  If the action 
is permitted, the access control system will proceed to do 
the requested action.  Otherwise, if the action should be 
denied, the access control system will reject the action.   
The formal representation of this policy enforcement 
model presented is presented in Figure 6.  The first rule 
models the behaviour of subject’s policy agent, causing 
the event of requesting an action whenever an obligation 
that specifies that action holds.  The next rule models a 
subject’s policy enforcement code rejecting the specified 
action to enforce a refrain.  The third rule models the 
behaviour of the target’s access controller, generating a 
doAction event when an action is permitted.  This event 
would trigger the relevant system behaviour rules thus 
causing the system state to change according to the 
specification.  The last rule models a target object’s 
access controller rejecting the action to prevent a denied 
operation from being performed. 
3.4 Policy Specification 
The final step in developing this logical notation is to 
represent the policies themselves.  As discussed in the 
previous sections, we are focussing on four types of 
policy – positive authorisation, negative authorisation, 
obligation and refrain.   
In order to correctly interact with the enforcement 
model described above, each policy specification rule 
should initiate the appropriate policy function symbol 
(permit, deny, oblig or refrain) for each of the events.  So 
for example, a positive authorisation policy rule should 
specify that permit(Subj, Operation) holds when the 
requestAction(Subj, Operation) event occurs and the 
constraints that control the applicability of the policy 
hold.  Additionally, the fluent permit(Subj, Operation)
should cease to hold once the action has been performed 
thus making it possible to re-evaluate the policy rule on 
subsequent requests to perform the action.  The Event 
Calculus representation of this functionality is shown in 
the (posAuth) specification in Figure 7.   This figure also 
shows how each of the other policy types would be 
represented by rules in the formal notation. 
For each rule, the terms, ObjSubj, ObjTarg, Action and 
Constraint, can be directly mapped to the subject, target, 
action, constraint and event clauses used when specifying 
policies in a language like Ponder.  Although Ponder 
constraints are specified using the Object Constraint 
Language (OCL), typical constraints only use a subset of 
features from this language.  As such, the Constraint
predicates in the Event Calculus rules above, can be 
represented by a combination of holdsAt terms.  Beckert 
et al. [13] describe approaches for mapping general OCL 
specifications into first order logic. This could be used to 
handle more complex OCL constraint expressions. The 
validSpec predicate, which is the second predicate in the 
body of these policy rules, is used to check that the 
objects and operations specified in the rules are consistent 
with the system description.  
The (negAuth) rule in Figure 7 represents a negative 
authorisation policy by stating that, if the Constraint
holds and the event requesting the action happens, the 
action is denied.  The second part of the (negAuth) rule 
shows how the deny fluent will be terminated once the 
decision to reject that action has been taken, thus 
allowing the rule to be re-evaluated on subsequent 
requests.  Note that the termination rules for these policies 
do not have any constraints and can be generically 
specified for the whole system. 
The (oblig) rule states that if the Constraint holds at 
the time that the system event, systemEvent(E), occurs, 
then the obligation for the subject to perform the action 
% Obligation / Refrain Enforcement Rule (Subject)
happens(requestAction(Subj, operation(Targ,
 Action(ParmList))), Tn) Å
 holdsAt(oblig(Subj, operation(Targ, Action(ParmList))),Tm)
 (Tm < Tn). 
happens(rejectAction(Subj, operation(Targ,
  Action(ParmList))), Tn) Å
  holdsAt(refrain(Subj, operation(Targ,Action(ParmList))),Tm)
 (Tm < Tn). 
% Access Control Rule (Target)
happens(doAction(Subj, operation(Targ,
  Action(ParmList))), Tn) Å
  holdsAt(permit(Subj, operation(Targ, Action(ParmList))), Tm)
 (Tm < Tn). 
happens(rejectAction(Subj, operation(Targ,
  Action(ParmList))), Tn) Å
  holdsAt(deny(Subj, operation(Targ, Action(ParmList))), Tm)
 (Tm < Tn). 
Figure 6: Policy enforcement rules. 
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8on the target holds. Like with the (posAuth) rule, we 
define that the obligation is terminated once the call to 
perform the specified operation is made.  This assumes 
that the execution of the operation is an atomic process, 
i.e. the execution of the operation is considered complete 
once a call to the operation has been made.  The (refrain) 
rule states that if the Constraint holds and any system 
event occurs, the subject should not perform the action on 
the target because the refrain holds.  Just like with the 
(negAuth) rule, the second part of the (refrain) rule 
defines that the refrain fluent is terminated once the 
policy enforcement decision to not perform the specified 
action is taken. 
A complete policy specification would involve 
instantiating the initiates rules defined above with 
specific subjects, targets and operations defined for the 
managed system.  The rules simply define the conditions 
under which a policy holds in the system.   
The use of the policy specification rules defined 
previously can be illustrated by extending the printer 
management example to include a range of policy rules.  
Policies could be used to specify the types of process that 
are allowed to access the print queue.  For example, only 
root processes are allowed to indiscriminately delete jobs 
from a queue.  A user process is only allowed to delete a 
print job if it has the same process identifier as the 
process that originated the job.  The print manager should 
handle an outOfPaper event by switching to an alternative 
input tray also reporting the event to the central console.   
We can use the notation described in this section to 
represent the Ponder policies shown in Figures 1 & 2 as 
follows: 
% Authorisation
initiates(requestAction(Process, operation(printMgr,
 cancelDoc(Job))), permit(Process, operation(printMgr,
 cancelDoc(Job))), T) Å
 validSpec(Process, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(Job)))
 holdsAt(pos(state(Process, owner, root)), T). 
initiates(requestAction(Process, operation(printMgr,
 cancelDoc(Job))), deny(Process, operation(printMgr,
 cancelDoc(Job))), T) Å
 validSpec(Process, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(Job)))
 holdsAt(neg(state(Process, owner, root)), T) 
 holdsAt(neg(state(Job, owner, Process)), T). 
% Obligation
initiates(systemEvent(systemShutdown), oblig(Process,
 operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(Job))), T) Å
 validSpec(Process, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(Job)))
 holdsAt(pos(state(Job, owner, Process)), T). 
The interaction between these policy rules and the 
enforcement, and behaviour model is illustrated in Figure 
8.  Here, the initial system state consists of a process, 
proc1, owned by ‘root’ and a print job, job1 that is owned 
by that process.  When the systemShutdown event occurs at 
t=1, this triggers the obligation rule shown above.  The 
assertion of the obligation fulfils the condition of the 
obligation enforcement rule and causes a request to 
perform the cancelDoc(Job) action to be generated.  This 
(posAuth) - initiates(requestAction(ObjSubj,operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))),permit(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList)))  Constraint. 
           terminates(doAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), permit(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))). 
(negAuth) - initiates(requestAction(ObjSubj,operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))),deny(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList)))  Constraint. 
           terminates(rejectAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), deny(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))). 
(oblig)   - initiates(systemEvent(E), oblig(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList)))  Constraint. 
           terminates(doAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), oblig(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))). 
(refrain) - initiates(systemEvent(_),refrain(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList)))  Constraint. 
           terminates(rejectAction(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), oblig(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))), Tm) Å
                             validSpec(ObjSubj, operation(ObjTarg, Action(ParmList))). 
Figure 7: Event Calculus representation of policies. 
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9event triggers the evaluation of the first authorisation 
policy rule above, causing the operation to be permitted, 
which then satisfies the condition of the access control 
enforcement rule.  After the doAction(…) event occurs at 
t=5, the termination rules specified in the enforcement 
model cause the permit and oblig fluents to be terminated 
at t=6. 
4. Policy Analysis 
Since the policy specification notation described above 
supports policy types that are semantically opposite to 
each other (e.g. obligations and refrains), conflicting 
policy specifications could arise. It is therefore important 
to provide a means of detecting conflicts in the policy 
specification as part of the logical framework.   
The different types of conflicts that can occur in a 
policy specification are identified in [2]. Modality 
conflicts arise when two policies are specified using the 
same subjects, targets and actions but are of opposite 
modality (e.g. positive and negative authorisations).  This 
type of conflict is domain-independent since conflicts 
could occur irrespective of the application domain for 
which the policies are being specified.  Other types of 
conflict identified in the literature fall into the category of 
application specific conflicts.  As described in [14], these 
include conflicts of duty, conflicts of interest, multiple 
manager conflicts, conflicts of priorities for resources and 
self-management conflicts. 
Considering the types of conflict described above, it is 
possible to define rules that can be used to recognise 
conflicting situations in the policy specification.  
4.1 Modality Conflicts 
Modality conflicts involving authorisation policies 
occur when there are two policies, one an authorisation 
and the other a prohibition, defined for the same subject, 
target and action.  The authConflict predicate defined 
below holds if an authorisation conflict is detected. 
holdsAt(authConflict(Subj, Op), Tm) Å
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, Op), Tm)   holdsAt(deny(Subj, Op), Tm). 
In a similar fashion, rules for detecting conflicts 
between obligations and refrains; and unauthorised 
obligation conflicts can be defined as follows: 
holdsAt(obligConflict(Subj, Op), Tm) Å
  holdsAt(oblig(Subj, Op), Tm)  holdsAt(refrain(Subj, Op), Tm).
holdsAt(unauthObligConflict(Subj, Op), Tm) Å
  holdsAt(oblig(Subj, Op), Tm)  holdsAt(deny(Subj, Op), Tm). 
In each of these rules, the Op variable will be 
instantiated with an operation term as defined in Section 
3.
4.2 Application Specific Conflicts 
One of the most common types of application specific 
conflict cited in the literature is conflict of duties 
(alternatively stated as the requirement to ensure 
separation of duties) [3, 14-16].  A conflict of duties will 
arise if the same subject is permitted to perform 
operations that, in the context of the application, are 
defined to be conflicting.  For example, in a company 
financial system, the operation of entering a request for 
payment and the operation of approving that request are 
potentially conflicting if the same user can perform both 
operations.  
Rules for application specific conflicts must be defined 
using constraints that include application specific data in 
addition to policy information.  However, before defining 
rules for detecting such conflicts, it is important to have a 
means of specifying this application specific information.  
The description of the various types of application 
specific conflicts in [14], suggests that: 
x A conflict of duty arises when the same subject 
performs both operations on the same target (e.g. an 
employee makes a payment request and approves it). 
x A conflict of interest arises when the same subject 
performs each of the operations on different targets. 
(e.g. a bank provides investment advice to a client 
whilst performing a merger for a competing client). 
x Different subjects perform each of the operations on 
a single target and the outcome of each operation is 
incongruent with the other. (e.g. spooling a job to a 
printer and shutting the same printer down). 
holdsAt(state(proc1, owner, root), 0), holdsAt(state(job1, owner, proc1), 0)
happens(systemEvent(systemShutdown), 1)
holdsAt(oblig(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 2)
happens(requestAction(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 3)
holdsAt(permit(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 4)
happens(doAction(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 5)
¬ holdsAt(permit(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 6),
¬ holdsAt(oblig(proc1, operation(printMgr, cancelDoc(job1))), 6)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time, t
Figure 8:Timeline of interactions between policy rules and enforcement model
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In order to capture this application specific 
information, we extend the system specification language 
described in Section 3 with a new symbol – 
conflictingOps(ConflictType, [Ops]). Here the 
ConflictType represents a constant value from the set 
{conflictDuty, conflictInterest, conflictGoal, 
conflictSelfMgmt}, indicating the type of application 
specific conflict that may arise if the operations are used 
in a policy specification.  The members of the Ops list are 
instantiated using the operation term defined previously.  
The symbol can be used to define ground literals in the 
system specification, specifying the action/target object 
combinations that will potentially conflict.  In the case of 
the conflict of duties example mentioned above, the 
potential conflict between the operations of requesting a 
payment and approving a payment would be represented 
as follows: 
conflictingOps(conflictDuty, [operation(payment, 
request(PaymentID,Amount)),operation(payment,approve(PaymentID))])
As described in the literature, the principle of 
separation of duty can take a number of different forms.  
In the first case, static separation of duty is ensured by not 
permitting a subject to perform an operation, Op1, if that 
subject has ever been granted permission for a different 
operation, Op2, and Op1 and Op2 are defined as members of 
a set of conflicting operations.  A policy specification that 
violates this principle will give rise to a conflict of duty. 
The second variation, dynamic separation of duty, 
requires that the runtime behaviour of the system should 
not allow conflicting operations to be performed.  Finally, 
the Chinese Wall policy [15] is a specialised form of 
dynamic separation of duty that prevents a subject 
performing any conflicting actions on one target, if the 
subject has already been given permission to perform a 
conflicting action on a different target.  A comprehensive 
formal treatment of separation of duty policies is 
presented in [16]. 
In the formalism presented here, we model the 
dynamic behaviour of the system because this is 
necessary for dealing with the effects of having 
constraints in the policy specification.  This allows us to 
treat the detection of static and dynamic conflicts of duty 
in a similar manner by defining rules of the following 
form, depending on the number of operations that could 
cause conflicts: 
holdsAt(sepOfDutyConflict(Subj, Ops), Tm) Å
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, Op1), T1) 
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, Op2), T2)  ... 
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, OpN), TN) 
 conflictingOps(conflictDuty, Ops) 
 memberOf(Op1, Ops) 
 memberOf(Op2, Ops)  ...  memberOf(OpN, Ops) 
 T1=<T2=<...=<TN=<Tm. 
The rule for detecting a conflict in a Chinese Wall 
policy is different because the conflict condition also 
depends on the targets involved. We represent this as 
follows: 
holdsAt(cwConflict(Subj,Target1,Action1,Target2,Action2), Tm) Å
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, operation(Target1, Action1)), T1) 
 holdsAt(permit(Subj, operation(Target2, Action2)), T2) 
 conflictingOps(conflictDuty, Ops)  Target1 != Target2 
 memberOf(operation(Target1, Action1), Ops) 
 memberOf(operation(Target2, Action2), Ops) 
 T1 =< T2 =< Tm. 
Another type of conflict, identified in the literature as a 
multiple management conflict, arises when different 
subjects attempt to perform actions on the same target, 
where the goals of those actions are incongruent.  For 
example, spooling a job to a printer and shutting the same 
printer down are operations with incompatible goals. We 
represent these operations using the constant, 
conflictGoal, in the conflictingOps term.   The 
following is a representation of the printer example above 
using this symbol:  
conflictOfGoalsOps(conflictGoal, [operation(printer,
  printDoc), operation(printer, shutDown)]). 
Once the incompatible operations have been defined, 
the following rules can be used to identify multiple 
manager conflicts in a policy specification: 
holdsAt(conflictOfMultiManagers(Subj1, Subj2, ..., SubjN
                                Ops), Tm) Å
 holdsAt(permit(Subj1, Op1), T1) 
 holdsAt(permit(Subj2, Op2), T2)   ... 
 holdsAt(permit(SubjN, OpN), TN) 
 conflictingOps(conflictGoal, Ops) 
 memberOf(Op1, Ops) 
 memberOf(Op2, Ops)   ...
 memberOf(OpN, Ops)  T1 =< T2 =< ... =< TN =< Tm. 
Similar rules are specified for other types of 
application specific conflicts, such as conflicts of interest 
and self-management conflicts. 
4.3 Detecting Conflicts 
By using one of the conflict fluents (e.g. 
unauthObligConflict) as a goal state, it is possible to 
query the system specification for event sequences that 
would result in a conflict occurring.  If no such sequence 
can be derived, it can be considered that the policy 
specification is free of this particular conflict type.   
The current implementation of the analysis system 
makes use of the abductive proof procedure presented in 
[12].  By treating the conflict fluents as safety properties 
of the system, this technique reduces the complexity of 
the abductive proof procedure to two time points – the 
time before the conflict arises (t) and the time after it 
arises (t1). Additionally, provided the conflict term is 
specified using ground literals, it can be shown that the 
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query will always generate a complete explanation for 
any conflicts and it will always terminate [12].   
Figure 9 shows an illustration of performing such a 
query on the example system presented previously.  Here 
some of the solutions, such as the last, present the trivial 
case in which a conflict might occur.  However, the first 
solution suggests that there is a sequence of events that 
will cause a conflict.  Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the policy specification contains a conflict. 
5. Policy Refinement 
The ability to specify policies and managed system 
behaviour in a notation that supports formal analysis that 
allows detection of inconsistencies is a worthy goal in its 
own right.  However, the longer term motivation for the 
work presented here, and a key problem area that we 
seeking to address is the development of new techniques 
for policy refinement.  In this section we present our 
initial ideas for a technique that makes use of the 
formalism presented above.   
The objective of policy refinement is to transform 
high-level policy specifications into more specific 
policies that are defined in terms of lower-level entities 
and operations of the system. More formally policy 
refinement could be defined as follows:  
Definition: (Policy Refinement) If there exists a set of policies 
Prs:p1, p2, .. pn, such that the enforcement of a combination of 
these policies results in a system behaving in an identical manner 
to a system that is enforcing some base policy Pb, it can be said 
that Prs is a refinement of Pb.  The set of policies Prs:p1, p2, .. pn 
is referred to as the refined policy set. 
Much of the work done in the requirements engineering 
domain for refining goals into implementation 
specifications could be applicable to policy refinement. 
Using this definition and drawing on work done to 
identify the properties of goal refinements [9] the 
following properties are proposed: 
1. Correctness: a refinement is said to be correct if the 
conjunction of all the members of that subset is a 
refinement of the base policy. 
2. Consistency:  a refinement is said to be consistent if 
there are no conflicts between any of the policies in 
the refined policy set. 
3. Minimality: a refinement is said to be minimal if it is 
correct and if removing any policy from the refined 
policy set causes the refinement to be incorrect. 
In addition, a policy refinement can be said to be 
complete iff all the properties defined above hold.  The 
goal refinement approach also specifies a fourth property, 
non-triviality, which requires there to be more than one 
element in the refined set.  However, in the policy 
refinement domain it may be acceptable to have a single 
policy that is a refinement of some base policy, provided 
that the refinement uses subjects, targets and actions that 
map to different physical entities.  Therefore we do not 
consider this property to be a requirement of 
completeness in a policy refinement. 
So, an essential requirement when refining a policy is 
to ensure that the goal achieved by that policy would still 
be achieved by the set of sub-policies that it is refined 
into.  Having a formalism that allows abductive reasoning 
offers some useful capabilities in this regard since such 
formalisms support goal regression.  Goal regression is a 
logical analysis technique that derives plans of action for 
achieving a specified end goal [17].  The desired end goal 
will be determined by the post-conditions of the operation 
specified in the base policy to be refined and abductive 
goal regression can be applied to derive the set of 
subject/operation tuples (of the form [(Subj1,
operation(Targ1, Action1)), … (SubjN, operation(TargN, 
ActionN))]) that will be used by the refined policy set.  
Because this procedure is based on a formal proof 
procedure, the derived set of subjects and operations will 
be correct and minimal. 
Having derived the set of subjects/operation 
combinations that will achieve the end goal of the base 
policy, it is now necessary to compose them into a refined 
policy set.  The manner in which this composition 
procedure is performed is dependant on the type of the 
base policy and any application specific constraints that 
need to be applied.  For example, if the goal of the 
operation specified in an authorisation policy can be 
refined to the set of subject/operation tuples, [(Subj1,
operation(Targ1, Action1)), … (SubjN, operation(TargN, 
ActionN))], one possibility for refinement of the original 
policy is to create a new authorisation policy for each of 
these subject/operation tuples and use the analysis 
techniques described here to validate that these new 
policies do not lead to any inconsistencies.  Alternatively, 
it may be necessary to limit the number of new 
authorisations created to ensure that some application-
?- demo([holdsAt(obligConflict(printMgr,
   operation(printer, printDoc)), t1)], [], Plan).
Plan = [initiallyTrue(state(printMgr,state,
  shuttingDown)), happens(systemEvent(printReq),t)]
Plan =  [initiallyTrue(refrain(printMgr, 
  operation(printer,printDoc))), 
happens(systemEvent(printReq),t)]
Plan = [happens(systemEvent(printReq),t), 
  initiallyTrue(state(printMgr,state,shuttingDown)), 
  initiallyTrue(oblig(printMgr,operation(printer, printDoc)))]
Plan = [initiallyTrue(refrain(printMgr,
   operation(printer,printDoc))), 
   initiallyTrue(oblig(printMgr, operation(printer,printDoc)))] 
Figure 9: Example of a conflict detection query
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specific constraint, such as a principle of least privilege, 
is observed.  This would require an alternative scheme for 
composing the subject/operation tuples into refined 
policies.  Each of these composition schemes can be 
considered to be a refinement pattern that is 
parameterised by factors such as the base policy type, the 
types on conflicts that should be checked for, any 
additional application specific constraints etc.  Certain 
patterns will apply to certain types of base policies, 
whereas others might be generically applicable to any 
base policy.  By developing a library of such patterns, it 
should be possible for the administrator to select any 
policy in the system and perform a refinement by 
applying a valid refinement pattern. However, significant 
work remains to be done towards this goal. 
6. Discussion 
When developing a formal language of the type 
presented here, it is important that it is expressive enough 
to represent the systems being modelled and that the 
language is based on solid theoretical foundations.  Event 
calculus is a good starting point for a formal language for 
specifying policy-based systems because it has direct 
support for representing the events used in these systems.  
Additionally, it is a well-researched area of logic 
programming that supports all modes of logical reasoning 
and provides a number of theoretical results and tools that 
have been leveraged in this work.  For example, the use 
of event calculus allows users to specify the system 
behaviour using more familiar notations, such as state 
charts, which can then be automatically translated into the 
logic program representation. Through the example 
presented here, it has been shown that the language is 
sufficiently expressive to model system objects, their 
organisation and behaviour together with policy rules that 
specify authorisations, obligations and refrains.  Also, the 
language supports analysis of the specification for 
detecting both modality conflicts and application specific 
conflicts.  A particular strength of the abductive analysis 
technique presented here is its ability to perform a priori 
analysis of partial specifications and not only detect the 
existence of potential conflicts but also to generate 
explanations for the conditions under which conflicts may 
arise.
Another important consideration in any formal 
technique is the decidability and computational 
complexity of the algorithm used.  We have briefly 
mentioned that using ground literals in any query term 
ensures termination of the conflict search process.  
Additionally, the formalism presented limits its use of 
first-order logic to stratified logic [18]. This permits a 
constrained use of recursion and negation while 
disallowing those combinations that lead to undecidable 
programs. Indeed, there are numerous studies that identify 
stratified logic as a class of first order logic that supports 
logic programs that are decidable [19, 20].  Moreover, 
such programs are decidable in polynomial time [3].  A 
more detailed analysis of the computational complexity 
and expressive power of stratified logic can be found in 
[20]. 
Although the formalism presented models different 
policy types and supports analysis for detecting a range of 
inconsistencies, there exist certain limitations to its 
capabilities.  For example, there is no support for 
grouping policies into structures such as roles and other 
management grouping described in [7].  Additionally, the 
formalism does not model meta-policies and the 
interaction of these policies with the underlying 
enforcement architecture.  It would be necessary to 
extend the language to support these constructs.  Finally, 
the current abductive proof procedure only provides basic 
diagnostic information about the event history that leads 
to inconsistencies.  This is because we reduce the problem 
to reasoning over just two time points.   This limitation 
can be addressed by using a more powerful tool, such as 
the A-system [21], which has the capability to perform 
abductive reasoning over an arbitrary time line. 
7. Related Work 
Amongst the many alternative approaches to policy 
specification, there are a number of proposals for formal, 
logic-based notations. In particular Logic-based 
languages have proved attractive for the specification of 
security policy, as they have a well-understood 
formalism, which is amenable to analysis.  However they 
can be difficult to use and are not always directly 
translatable into efficient implementation.  A number of 
formalisms for security policy assume a role based access 
control (RBAC) model, including RSL99[22], Role 
Definition Language [23] and Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) 
[24].  Additionally there are languages that take 
advantage of the computational efficiencies offered by 
using subsets of first order logic, such as stratified logic. 
Barker presents in [25] a language that supports 
specification of access control policies using stratified 
clause-form logic, with emphasis on RBAC policies.  
However, this work does not discuss techniques for 
detecting conflicts in policy specifications.  The 
Authorisation Specification Language (ASL) proposed by 
Jajodia et al. [3] is another example of a language based 
on stratified clause-form logic that also offers techniques 
for detecting modality conflicts and some application 
specific conflicts in authorisation policy specifications.  
However, this technique does not support static analysis 
of policy specifications that use constraints, assuming 
instead that conflict detection will take place at runtime. 
The Policy Description Language (PDL) [4] is an 
example of first-order logic being applied to the 
specification of obligation policies. The language can be 
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described as a real-time specialised production rule 
system to define policies. The syntax of PDL is simple 
and policies are described by a collection of two types of 
expressions: policy rules and policy defined event 
propositions.  Later work by Chomicki [5], extends PDL 
to include the concept of action constrains, which are 
policies that prevent a specified action from being 
performed in a given situation.  These action constraints 
are analogous to the refrain policies described in this 
paper.  This work introduces the idea of using a policy 
monitor to detect conflict situations and resolve them by 
either suppressing the events that could lead to a conflict 
or overriding the conflicting action.  Additionally, work 
by Son and Lobo, presents an approach for reasoning 
about policies with the objective of mapping a desired 
action history back to a possible event history [26].  This 
work is interesting because it illustrates how formal 
techniques together with logic programming can be used 
to derive information about the policy program – in this 
case the event history that causes a particular set of 
actions.  However, PDL does not model authorisation 
policies and therefore the analysis cannot detect conflicts 
involving authorisations. 
Recent work on using policies for adaptation of mobile 
devices [27] proposes Event Calculus as a suitable 
formalism for policy specification.  However, this 
technique only models obligation policies and support for 
conflict detection using the notation is still under 
development.  Finally there is ongoing work at Imperial 
College to develop a formal language for contract 
representation that is using Event Calculus as a baseline 
notation.  It is expected that the notation presented here 
would be of particular relevance to this effort. 
There are few examples of practical approaches for 
policy refinement.  One such example is described in 
work done at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, which 
outlines a policy-authoring environment that provides a 
policy wizard tool, called POWER, for refining policies 
[28].  Here, a domain expert first develops a set of policy 
templates, expressed as Prolog programs, and the policy 
authoring tools have an integrated inference engine that 
interprets these programs to guide the user through the 
refinement process.  A major limitation of this approach 
is the absence of any analysis capabilities to evaluate the 
consistency of the refined policies.  Also, the POWER 
approach depends on the domain expert having a detailed 
understanding of the entire system to develop a usable 
policy template.  The refinement approach outlined in this 
paper avoids these problems by not only incorporating a 
complete analysis technique but also supporting abductive 
reasoning for deriving the action sequences required to 
achieve a goal. 
Work done at University College London proposes 
using model checking for verifying the consistency of 
rules specified for a DiffServ router [29].  This technique 
depends on generating packet flows that can be used by 
the model-checking tool.  However it is not possible to 
generate a complete set of packets that would ensure an 
exhaustive verification of the specification. Additionally, 
many of the packets generated will be benign – causing 
no inconsistencies in the system.  By modelling the 
DiffServ modules using the formalism presented in this 
paper, it would be possible to use abduction to derive just 
those packets that could cause an inconsistency to arise.  
We are currently in the process of coding an example 
DiffServ router configuration and associated rules to 
validate this approach. 
8. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we have described the use of Event 
Calculus and abductive reasoning for developing a 
language that supports specification and analysis of 
policy based systems.  The language is sufficiently 
expressive to model systems using a combination of 
authorisation, obligation and refrain policies.  
Additionally we have shown how an abductive analysis 
procedure can be used to detect modality conflicts and a 
range of application specific conflicts. 
We outline an initial approach for using the formalism 
presented for refining policies.  Developing a library of 
refinement patterns that can be used in conjunction with 
the abductive analysis technique presented here will be 
the focus of our future work.  Also, as part of this work 
we will look at developing tools to support the 
specification, analysis and refinement of policies using 
this formal notation. Additionally we are hoping to apply 
this formalism to a network management example that 
uses policy-based management for QoS provision in 
DiffServ networks.
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